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HOW TO WIN A MERGER CASE IN
THE SUPREME COURT
SCOTI E. BOHON*
For over twenty years, antitrust lawyers who defend corporate
mergers have been searching for a practical answer to the question
"How can a merger case be won in the Supreme Court under section
7 of the Clayton Act?"' Happily, the first successful object lessons in
this field have finally been provided in two recent United States Su-
preme Court decisions, United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,2
which sustained General Dynamics' acquisition of the United Electric
Coal Company, and United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.,3
* Member of the Illinois and New York Bars. A.B., 1951, LL.B., 1953, Univer-
sity of Illinois; LL.M., 1954, New York University.
In the interest of "full disclosure," the reader is warned that the author does not claim
to be free of bias in this field since he has represented antitrust plaintiffs, International
Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii 1972)
(representing IT&T), and defendants, United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
1971 Trade Cas. 90,530 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (representing IT&T and Canteen Corp.);
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970) (rep-
resenting IT&T and Grinnell Corp.); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969) (representing IT&T and Hartford Fire Ins. Co.);
United States v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 1960 Trade Cas. 76,412 (S.D. Fla. 1960); FTC
v. United States Steel Corp., 5 CCH TRADB REG. REP. at 24,457 (1973) (FTC Docket
No. 8655) (Certified Industries case).
1. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), provides in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.
2. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
3. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
Several excellent analyses of these cases have already appeared. See Book, Rediscov-
ering Economic Realism in Defining Competition, CoNFEnRE~c BD. REc., June 1974,
at 6; New Directions for Mergers (pts. 1 & 2), BNA AirrRusT & TRADE RE. Ra P.
No. 676, at B-I (Aug. 13, 1974), & No. 677, at B-1 (Aug. 20, 1974); The Supreme
Court, 1973 Term, 88 HxRv. L. Rv. 43, 251 (1974). Ms. Bock points out that the
majority in General Dynamics downgraded the importance of the determination of the
"relevant market," indicated that the question could be side-stepped entirely, and af-
firmed the use of postmerger market evidence. Bock, supra at 9; see text accompanying
notes 20-24 infra. The BNA analysis concludes:
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which sustained Marine Bancorporation's acquisition of the Washington
Trust Bank of Spokane.
I. PREVIous CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 7
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
-'-Until the General Dynamics decision was handed down on March
19, 1974, antitrust lawyers seeking guidance on the Supreme Court's
attitude towards mergers had been forced to scrutinize a long line of
opinions that struck down virtually every merger that came before the
Court.- The fundamental test applied under section 7 to corporate ac-
quisitions was announced by the Court in United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank:
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evi-
dence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anti-
competitive effects. . ...
. ..Without attempting to specify the smallest market share which
would. . . be considered to threaten undue concentration, we are clear
that 30% presents that threatYt
The General Dynamics and Marine Bancorporation decisions should
be considered in light of the application of this test in the recent case
Without belaboring the obvious point that the Supreme Court's composition
has changed, it is clear that the Court's analytical approach to the review of
§ 7 cases has become more flexible. A statistical approach in and of itself,
unless overwhelming, may well fail if "other pertinent factors" can be raised
which point to no lessening of competition.
[Ift would be well to emphasize that the Court's view of statistical
proof, post-acquisition evidence and relevant markets (as well as the "failing
company" analogy) are significant departures from past cases.
New Directions for Mergers (pt. 1), supra at B-8 (footnotes omitted).
4. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); FTC v. Proc-
ter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270 (1966); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962);
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). See also AMER-
IcAN BAR Ass'N, ANrmusT DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, at 66 (1968): "The Government
has invariably opposed the defendant's [product market definition] contentions and al-
most invariably has prevailed."
5. 374 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
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of United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.6 Falstaff, a major national
beer producer that did not sell beer in the New England States, wanted
to acquire the Narragansett Brewing Co., the largest seller of beer in
New England. The district court found that Falstaff was not a signifi-
cant "potential competitor" in the New England market because it
would never have entered the market de novo.1 In an opinion by Jus-
tice White, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas and
Blackmun concurred,8 the case was remanded to the district court with
instructions to consider "whether Falstaff was a potential competitor in
the sense that it was so positioned on the edge of the market that it
exerted beneficial influence on competitive conditions in that market."9
In plain language, the Court considered it important whether the exist-
ing beer producers in New England perceived Falstaff as a potential
new entrant and thus might moderate their pricing and production deci-
sions in order to discourage Falstaff from entering the market. Signifi-
cantly, Mr. Justice White's opinion stated:
Because we remand for proper assessment of Falstaff as an on-the-
fringe potential competitor, it is not necessary to reach the question of
whether § 7 bars a market-extension merger by a company whose entry
into the market would have no influence whatsoever on the present state
of competition in the market-that is, the entrant will not be a dominant
force in the market and has no current influence in the marketplace.
We leave for another day the question of the applicability of § 7 to a
merger that will leave competition in the marketplace exactly as it was,
neither hurt nor helped, and that is challengeable under § 7 only on
grounds that the company could, but did not, enter de novo or through
"toe-hold" acquisition and that there is less competition than there would
have been had entry been in such a manner.10
Perhaps members of the antitrust defense bar may be excused for
having developed a cynical attitude about the Court's objectivity in ap-
6. 410 U.S. 526 (1973), rev'g 332 F. Supp. 970 (D.R.I. 1971).
7. 332 F. Supp. at 972.
8. Justices Brennan and Powell took no part in the decision of the case. 410 U.S.
at 538.
9. Id. at 532-33. On remand, the Government introduced no additional evidence.
The district court again dismissed the case after reconsidering the record and finding
that New England beer competitors did not in fact view Falstaff as a potential competi-
tor, that no rational beer seller in New England would have regarded Falstaff as a poten-
trial entrant, and that Falstaff was not a "potential competitor so positioned on the edge
of said market that it exerted a beneficial influence on competitive conditions therein."
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 5 CCH TRADEFG. RFP. (1974-2 Trade Cas.
98,006) 75,315, at 98,012 (D.R.I. Oct. 23, 1974).
10. 410 U.S. at 537.
IMMRGER CASE
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plying these standards, a subject of obviously great importance in the
development of efficient and economical industrial organization and al-
location of capital. It seemed to antitrust defense lawyers and their
businessmen-clients that there was little logical, legal, or economic con-
sistency or realism in the Court's definitions of relevant geographic
markets and product lines. It seemed that whenever the Government
appealed an adverse trial court decision, the Court would ignore Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which provides that the trial court's
findings of fact should not be overturned on appeal unless they are
"clearly erroneous." As Mr. Justice Stewart noted, dissenting in
United States v. Von's Grocery Co.:
In a single sentence and an omnibus footnote at the close of its opin-
ion, the Court pronounces its work consistent with the line of our deci-
sions under § 7 . . . The sole consistency that I can find is that in
litigation under § 7, the Government always wins."
With this background, it is easy to understand why both the antitrust
defense bar and the business community welcomed the Supreme
Court's decisions in General Dynamics and Marine Bancorporation.
They hoped that these decisions marked the end of the "knee-jerk"
era in which the Court could be counted on to kick the defendant every
time the Government swung the mallet.1 2
II. GENERAL DYNAMICS, MARINE BANCORPORATION, AND
OTHER RECENT CASES CONSTRUING SECTION 7
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
A. The Facts
In the quaint jargon of antitrust law, General Dynamics involved a
"horizontal merger," a combination of two significant coal mining com-
panies that operated in the same geographic market areas in direct and
active competition. A significant factor in the case was that the com-
petitive viability of a natural resource enterprise such as a coal mining
company is largely dependent on its existing or available control of ade-
11. 384 U.S. 270,301 (1966).
12. In light of the twenty-year history of government victories, see note 4 supra,
it is ironic to find Justice Douglas complaining in his General Dynamics dissent that
"[on the basis of a record so devoid of findings based on correct legal standards, the
judgment may not be affirmed except on a deep-seated judicial bias against § 7 of the
Clayton Act." 415 U.S. at 527.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/2
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quate mineable reserves.13 The acquired company, United Electric
Coal, had already sold or committed virtually all of its existing reserves
under long term contracts and could not find additional reserves.14
This was the crucial fact in the case; from it the district court deduced
two conclusions: "United Electric has neither the possibility of acquir-
ing more nor the ability to develop. . . reserves.""6
Marine Bancorporation involved a "market extension" or "potential
competition" merger, a combination of two banking organizations that
did not compete with each other because their operations were carried
on in different sections of Washington-Seattle and Spokane.1 6  The
critical fact in the case was that the acquiring Seattle bank could not
realistically be called a potential competitor 7 in the Spokane market
area because state banking law prevented both de novo establishment
of a branch or new bank in Spokane 8 and acquisition of the only other
13. The principal contention of Justice Douglas' dissent, 415 U.S. at 511-27, was
that the trial court's market findings were based on the situation at the time of the trial
(1968), rather than at the time of the acquisition in question (1959), and thus errone-
ously reflected General Dynamics' postacquisition conduct. "While findings made as of
the time of the merger could concededly be tempered to a limited degree by postacquisi-
tion events, no such findings were ever made." Id. at 524. This point was not raised
in the trial court or in the Government's jurisdictional statement to the Supreme Court,
but was raised for the first time in the Government's Supreme Court brief. Brief for
Appellees at 74-75. The majority noted that at trial the Government had described evi-
dence concerning the situation at the time of acquisition in 1959 as "irrelevant." 415
U.S. at 504 n.12.
14. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534, 560 (N.D. Ill.
1972); 415 U.S. at 493.
15. 341 F. Supp. at 560.
16. 418 U.S. at 606-09.
In a companion "potential competition" bank merger case decided the same day, all
Justices concurred in vacating and remanding for further consideration a trial court deci-
sion sustaining a proposed merger of two noncompeting Connecticut commercial banks.
The Court held that the trial court had erred in including savings banks with commer-
cial banks as part of the appropriate "line of commerce" and had further erred in ruling
that the relevant geographic market for testing the legality of the merger was the entire
state of Connecticut, rather than the more localized geographic areas in which the banks
were actually engaged in business. United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S.
656 (1974). On December 2, 1974, this case was dismissed without prejudice on the
ground that the proposed consolidation of the two banks had been abandoned. 5 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 1 45,071, at 53,435 (D. Conn. Dec. 2, 1974).
17. The Government presented several theories of potential competition in Marine
Bancorporation. 418 U.S. at 615-18. The Court held that the potential competition
question raised in Marine Bancorporation was distinguishable from that raised in Fal-
staff, see notes 6-10 supra and accompanying text, and therefore declined to decide the
question it had reserved in the latter case. 418 U.S. at 639.
18. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 30.40.020 (Supp. 1973), construed in 418 U.S.
at 610-12.Washington University Open Scholarship
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"independent small bank with offices located within the city boundaries
of Spokane ..
B. The Law
In both General Dynamics and Marine Bancorporation, the Supreme
Court" upheld the trial court's finding that no substantial lessening of
competition occurred or was threatened within the terms of section 7
of the Clayton Act as a result of the combinations in question. Taking
the opinions at face value,2" there are definite indications that a ma-
jority of the present members of the Court will no longer apply a per
se or bare statistical market-share test to determine possible effects on
competition of a proposed merger, but instead will focus on the eco-
nomic and competitive realities of the marketplace. That is certainly
the message that appears on the face of the majority opinion in General
Dynamics:
While the statistical showing proffered by the Government in this
case, the accuracy of which was not discredited by the District Court
or contested by the appellees, would under this approach have sufficed
to support a finding of "undue concentration" in the absence of other
considerations, the question before us is whether the District Court was
justified in finding that other pertinent factors affecting the coal industry
and the business of the appellees mandated a conclusion that no substan-
tial lessening of competition occurred or was threatened by the acquisi-
tion of United Electric. We are satisfied that the court's ultimate find-
ing was not in error.22
The majority opinion in Marine Bancorporation, however, repeatedly
emphasizes that "this case concerns an industry in which new entry is
extensively regulated by the State and Federal Governments"28 and
points out that "[o]ur affirmance of the District Court's judgment in
19. 418 U.S. at 613; see WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 30.04.230, .08.020(7), .40.020
(Supp. 1973), construed in 418 U.S. at 610-12.
20. Pursuant to the then-effective Expediting Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970), anti-
trust cases in which the United States was the complainant were appealed from the dis-
trict court directly to the Supreme Court. The Expediting Act was amended on Decem-
ber 21, 1974, to provide for appeals to the courts of appeals unless the trial judge certi-
fies the case directly to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court exercises its discre-
tion to hear the case. Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 5, 88 Stat. 1709 (1974).
21. For a discussion of the advisability of this approach, see text accompanying
notes 23-24, 37-40, 48-54 infra.
22. 415 U.S. at 497-98.
23. 418 U.S. at 639; id. at 609, 627-30; see text accompanying notes 37-39 infra.
[Vol. 1974:633
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this case rests primarily on state statutory barriers to de novo entry and
to expansion following entry into a new geographic market. 24 Thus,
Marine Bancorporation is hardly an invitation to businessmen to begin
a mass merger movement.
The Government was reduced to contending that the Seattle bank
might circumvent the state's regulatory barriers to new entry by (1)
creation and later acquisition of a new bank whose stock had been
placed in the hands of friendly persons ("sponsorship"), or (2) foot-
hold acquisition of one of the two remaining small banks in the Spokane
area (one was located in a suburb and, if acquired, could not have
branched into Spokane; the other was a new bank barred by state law
from being sold until 1975).25 The majority opinion noted that the
Government pressed the latter theory with less vigor than it did the
former, "which may reflect the fact that under the [foothold acquisi-
tion] approach the total number of banking organizations in Spokane
would remain the same. 26  The Court held, however, that, even as-
suming entry into the Spokane market was possible in either of these
ways, the Government nevertheless failed to prove that these methods
of entry "would be reasonably likely to produce any significant procom-
petitive benefits in the Spokane commercial banking market '' 27 or "the
long-term market-structure benefits predicted by the Government."2
Despite the obvious weakness of the Government's factual market
contentions in Marine Bancorporation, Justices White, Brennan, and
Marshall would have granted judgment to the Government:
[Ilt is sufficiently plain from the record that absent merger with [the
Spokane bank], [the Seattle bank] could and would either have made a
toehold entry or been instrumental in establishing a sponsored bank in
Spokane. But [the Seattle bank] chose to merge with a larger bank
and to deprive the market of the competition it would have offered had
it entered in either of two other ways. In my opinion, this made out
a sufficient prima facie case under § 7, which, absent effective rebuttal,
entitled the United States to judgment. 29
Summarizing the prior case law, the majority opinion in Marine Ban-
corporation indicates that the potential competition doctrine may be ap-
24. 418 U.S. at 641.
25. Id. at 633-39.
26. Id. at 637 n.44.
27. Id. at 636.
28. Id. at 638.
29. Id. at 646 (dissenting opinion).Washington University Open Scholarship
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plicable to geographic market extension acquisitions. 0 To bring its
case within the doctrine, the Government argued that the merger would
eliminate "the prospect for long-term deconcentration of an oligopolis-
tic market'1 that would be achieved if the Seattle bank entered de
novo or through a toehold acquisition. This, of course, was the issue
left open in Falstaff.2
Marine Bancorporation makes it clear that the Government can carry
its burden of establishing a prima facie case that a localized market is
sufficiently "concentrated" to call for application of the potential com-
petition doctrine simply by introducing evidence of high "concentration
ratios" (e.g., evidence that the three largest Spokane banks control
92% of the city's total bank deposits). Upon the introduction of such
evidence, the burden shifts to the defendants, who must produce rebut-
tal evidence:
On this aspect of the case, the burden was then upon appellees to show
that the concentration ratios, which can be unreliable indicators of actual
market behavior [citing General Dynamics], did not accurately depict
the economic characteristics of the Spokane market. In our view, appel-
lees did not carry this burden. . . . Appellees introduced no signifi-
cant evidence of the absence of parallel behavior in the pricing or pro-
vision of commercial bank services in Spokane.33
If the defendant fails to discredit the Government's concentration sta-
tistics, the Government then has the further burden of proving the basic
30. Id. at 627. Proof of three factual circumstances would establish a potential
competition case:
if the target market is substantially concentrated, if the acquiring firm has the
characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive to render it a perceived
potential de novo entrant, and if the acquiring firm's premerger presence on
the fringe of the target market in fact tempered oligopolistic behavior on the
part of existing participants in that market.
Id. at 624-25. The Court also observed:
[Ilhe doctrine comes into play only where there are dominant participants in
the target market engaging in interdependent or parallel behavior and with the
capacity effectively to determine price and total output of goods or services.
Id. at 630. It is important to note, however, that the Government did not place its
"principal reliance" on this variant of the doctrine. Id. at 625; see text accompanying
note 31 infra. For a discussion of the relevant theories see Swennes, Three Theories
of Potential Competition Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Reaching the Conglom-
erate Merger, 49 TuL. L. REv. 139 (1974).
31. 418 U.S. at 625.
32. See text accompanying note 10 supra. The question left undecided in Falstaff
is to be distinguished from the issues resolved in prior potential competition cases. See
note 30 supra and accompanying text.
33. 418 U.S, at 631-32 (emphasis 4dded; footnote omitted).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/2
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preconditions of the potential competition doctrine:
(1) "that feasible alternative methods of entry in fact existed"; and
(2) "that the alternative means offer a reasonable prospect of long-
term structural improvement or other benefits in the target mar-
ket."3 4
The type of evidence the Court expects on the potential competition
issue is illustrated by its comment:
The Government introduced no evidence, for example, establishing that
the three small banks presently in Spokane have had any meaningful
effect on the economic behavior of the large Spokane banks.35
Later, in the same vein, the Court added:
If regulatory restraints [on alternative methods of entry] are not deter-
minative, courts should consider the factors that are pertinent to any
potential-competition case, including the economic feasibility and like-
lihood of de novo entry, the capabilities and expansion history of the
acquiring firm, and the performance as well as the structural character-
istics of the target market.36
34. Id. at 638-39 (emphasis added). Note that earlier in the opinion the latter
portion of the Government's burden of proving "preconditions" is stated in somewhat
different and more expansive language: "It must be determined ...that those means
offer a substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration of that market or
other significant procompetitive effects." Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 637. The Government's failure of proof on this issue was crucial because
"[tihis assumed method of entry. . . would offer little realistic hope of ultimately pro-
ducing deconcentration of the Spokane market." Id. at 636.
36. Id. at 642.
In the companion case, United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974),
see note 16 supra, Justice Powell's majority opinion set forth a number of general rules
and guidelines for the district courts to follow in market extension "potential competi-
tion" bank merger cases. First, the court must determine by a
localized approach. . . the geographic market in which [each bank] operates
and to which the bulk of its customers may turn for alternative commercial
bank services.. . . The task is important, because the definition of the re-
spective geographic markets determines the number of alternate avenues of en-
try theoretically open to [the Bridgeport bank] in piercing [the New Haven
bank's] area of significant competitive influence and vice versa.
[ .. The burden of producing evidence on this subject is on the Govern-
ment. . . . [It is] the Government's role to come forward with evidence de-
lineating the rough approximation of localized banking markets ....
418 U.S. at 668-70.
Secondly, in defining geographic markets of the two banks in question, the Govern-
ment cannot rely, without more, on the Office of Management and Budget's Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) since "they are not sufficiently refined in terms
of realistic commercial banking markets to satisfy the Government's burden." Id. at
670. Nor, "as the banks would have it, [may the district court] rely solely on towns asWashington University Open Scholarship
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C. Analysis
Marine Bancorporation may well turn out to be of more practical sig-
nificance -to practicing antitrust lawyers and their clients than General
Dynamics. The reason is that the facts of most horizontal mergers of
direct competitors will bear little resemblance to United Electric Coal's
practical inability to contribute meaningfully to further competition be-
cause it could not acquire or develop mining reserves. Furthermore,
the simple geographic market extension type of acquisition involved in
Marine Bancorporation occurs in many industries and has always been
of great practical importance to the efficient and normal growth of en-
terprises of all sizes.
On the other hand, the Court expressly limited its holding in Marine
Bancorporation to "an industry in which new entry is extensively regu-
lated by the State and Federal Governments"37 and distinguished the
relatively free market situation presented by the beer industry in the
Falstaff case:38
Unlike, for example, the beer industry, .. entry of new competitors
into the commercial banking field is "wholly a matter of governmental
grace . . ." and "far from easy." . . . Beer manufacturers are free to
base their decisions regarding entry and the scale of entry into a new
geographic market on nonregulatory considerations, including their own
financial capabilities, their long-range goals as to markets, the cost of
creating new production and distribution facilities, and above all the
profit prospects in the target market. . . . No comparable freedom ex-
ists for commercial banks.3 9
In addition to this obvious limitation on the applicability of Marine
Bancorporation to mergers in other industries, bank mergers involve
unusual statutory and evidentiary factors that tend to limit their useful-
the relevant geographic markets" since
not all towns are closed to de novo branching by one or the other bank, and
it seems fair to assume that the area of significant competitive influence of
some bank offices may extend beyond town boundaries.
Id. at 671.
Finally, after delineating the localized banking markets surrounding the sites where
the two banks maintain their offices, the district court must then apply the potential
competition standard, evaluating "the economically and legally feasible alternative meth-
ods of entry, if any, into those areas available to one bank or the other." Id.
37. 418 U.S. at 639.
38. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); see notes 6-10
supra and accompanying text.
39. 418 U.S. at 628-29.
[Vol. 1974:633
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ness as precedents in other merger situations. First, the Bank Merger
Act of 1966 provides that mergers of banks may be justified by evi-
dence of "the convenience and needs of the community to be served" 40
even if the merger would otherwise violate section 7 of the Clayton Act.
It would seem, however, that a judge's views on the "reasonable pros-
pect of long-term structural improvement""1 or "significant procompeti-
tive effects"4 2 as preconditions to the application of the potential com-
petition doctrine would be influenced by evidence introduced under the
"convenience and needs" defense. This evidence is often extensive,
involving "increased loan limits, different types of loans, international
banking services, computer services, enhanced trust services, and other
benefits. 4 3  Evidence of the procompetitive effects of a merger would
probably be inadmissible in a merger case involving another business,
and it is difficult to assess what practical effect the evidence would have
on the thought processes of a judge considering a potential competition
case.
Secondly, the economic and statistical factors that are pertinent to
antitrust analysis are more readily available in bank merger cases than
in cases involving almost any other business, and the long line of bank
merger cases has identified and refined the crucial factors to an extent
unmatched in almost any other line of commerce. 44 This greatly sim-
plifies the task of counsel in initially analyzing and ultimately preparing
for trial in bank merger cases.4 5
Thirdly, the banking industry is blessed with numerous expert gov-
ernment regulators who analyze each merger (and then commonly dis-
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (1970). In Marine Bancorporation the Supreme
Court expressly noted that it did not find it necessary to reach the issue of that special-
ized defense. 418 U.S. at 618 n.15. The district court, however, had "issued extensive
findings of fact concerning the 'convenience and needs' defense" and had concluded that
"even if the merger violated . . . the Clayton Act, it was nevertheless lawful under the
Bank Merger Act of 1966." Id.
41. 418 U.S. at 639; see text accompanying note 34 supra.
42. 418 U.S. at 632-39; see text accompanying note 27 supra.
43. 418 U.S. at 618 n.15.
44. See cases cited id. at 627-28 n.30.
45. The complexity of merger cases is vividly illustrated by the majority and minor-
ity opinions in both Marine Bancorporation and its companion, United States v. Connec-
ticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974), see note 16 supra. Despite this important factual
head start, there is still, even in the banking industry, plenty of room for disagreement
and litigation on the basic economic and factual questions of determining the relevant
product market and the relevant geographic market to test the probable competitive ef-
fects of the merger.
643MERGE R CASE
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agree on its probable effects). For example, in Marine Bancorporation
the Comptroller of the Currency approved the merger while the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System submitted negative reports on the competitive
effects of the merger, primarily because of "their conclusions . . .on
the degree of concentration in commercial banking in Washington as
a whole. '46  Such disagreements among the government experts, and
their frequent disagreements with the "far-out" theories sometimes ad-
vanced by the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, obviously make
it easier for defense counsel in bank merger cases to persuade judges
that the Government's arguments need not be accepted as Holy Writ.
Finally, since the banking industry has been extensively studied by
economists for years, it is comparatively easy to find knowledgeable
economists to help counsel prepare for trial and to testify as expert wit-
nesses in bank merger cases.47
It could be argued that General Dynamics was not a landmark Clay-
ton Act case, but rather was .a procedural or evidentiary anomaly.
First, the vote was close, five to four. Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist constituted the major-
ity, and Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall joined in a bit-
ter~dissent. The case may thus reflect only transitory changes in the
personnel of the Court or a mere change in the number of Justices with
a "deep-seated judicial bias" toward section 7, rather than a lasting
change in legal standards or the quantum of evidence required to prove
a violation of section 7. Despite Justice White's reference in his
Marine Bancorporation dissent to a "new antitrust majority" on the
Court,48 it is obvious that a single change in personnel could destroy
the "new antitrust majority," whether its theories are based on personal-
ities, "judicial biases," or substantive judicial standards.
46. 418 U.S. at 613.
47. See text accompanying notes 65-68 infra.
An excellent example of a battle of expert economics witnesses was presented in the
early case of United States v. Crocker-Anglo Natl Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal.
1967), which was so decisively lost by the Government that no appeal was taken.
48. 418 U.S. at 642 (White, J., dissenting):
For the second time this Term, the Court's new antitrust majority has
chipped away at the policies of § 7 of the Clayton Act. In United States v.
General Dynamics Corp.... the majority sustained the failing-company de-
fense in a new guise. Here, it redefines the elements of potential competition
and dramatically escalates the burden of proving that a merger "may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition" within the meaning of § 7.
[Vol. 1974:633
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Secondly, only two weeks after upholding General Dynamics' acqui-
sition of United Electric Coal, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
an important section 7 case, Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC,49 in
which the Federal Trade Commission had ruled against Kennecott's ac-
quisition of the Peabody Coal Company. While the case can be distin-
guished on its facts from General Dynamics,50 if the new antitrust ma-
jority had really wanted to alter substantially the construction of section
7, they surely would have voted to grant certiorari in an important case
involving the same industry and many of the same issues that were
present in General Dynamics. It is always dangerous to read much sig-
nificance into a denial of certiorari, but it does seem significant that
not even four Justices believed that some of the Court's time should
be spent in reviewing an FTC decision that struck down a major coal
industry acquisition on the rather ephemeral theory of potential com-
petition.5' This seems particularly significant in light of the Court's dis-
cussion of the potential competition doctrine in the bank merger field
in Marine Bancorporation.52
Thirdly, General Dynamics may signify a change only in the defer-
ence that the Court is prepared to give to factfindings by trial courts
under the "clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 52(a). This would explain the Court's denial of certiorari in
Kennecott Copper since the findings of fact by the FTC were all ad-
49. 416 U.S. 909, rehearing denied, 416 U.S. 963 (1974).
50. General Dynamics and United Electric Coal Co. were existing, direct "horizon-
tal" competitors in the mining and sale of coal in the Middle West, although United
had little future economic potential because of its inability to locate additional reserves
for its method of strip mining. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp.
534, 559 (N.D. Ill. 1972). On the other hand, Peabody Coal Co. was the country's
second largest coal mining company, and the FTC found that the Kennecott Copper Co.
was an economically significant "potential competitor" because it already owned certain
underground coal reserves and had considered mining them. Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 76-77 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974).
51. Only Justice Stewart noted that he thought the Court should have granted cer-
tiorari. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 416 U.S. 909 (1974).
52. Text accompanying notes 30-36 supra; see United States v. Connecticut Nat'l
Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974), dismissed, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP'. 45,071 (D. Conn.
Dec. 2, 1974).
In July 1974, the Supreme Court affirmed a district court decision which held that
the acquisition by Phillips Petroleum Co. of the western assets of Tidewater Oil Co. vio-
lated § 7 of the Clayton Act because "[tihe anticompetitive effects of the elimination
of Phillips as a possible future entrant and of the procompetitive edge effect it exerted
were both substantial." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 3199 (1974),
aff'g mem. 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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verse to the merger in that case. Those findings had also survived pre-
vious judicial review by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"
under the "substantial evidence" standard set by Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB5 for review of administrative agency findings. The
new antitrust majority may simply feel that it would be procedurally
inappropriate and administratively burdensome for the Court to attempt
to review and overturn an administrative agency's essentially factual de-
terminations of probable economic effect. If that assumption is correct,
it would be logical for the Court to vote not to hear such a case unless
the decision of the reviewing court of appeals revealed either substan-
tial errors of law in its application of appropriate antitrust legal stand-
ards or an affirmance of agency findings of fact clearly unsupported by
substantial evidence.
Despite these considerations, it is likely that General Dynamics and
Marine Bancorporation do, as the opinions themselves import, mark the
beginning of a new era in the construction of section 7 of the Clayton
Act. This conclusion is supported by the Court's disposition of
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc.65 On December 19,
1973, the commodity firm of Cargill, Inc., began an attempt to acquire
the Missouri Portland Cement Company through a cash tender offer
that was vigorously opposed by the target company.5 Missouri Port-
land immediately initiated the usual private litigation alleging violations
of the federal securities laws and section 7 of the Clayton Act.57 On
antitrust grounds, the district court granted a preliminary injunction
against continuing the tender offer, 8 but on June 10, 1974, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the grant of the injunction."
53. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 909 (1974).
54. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
55. 95 S. Ct. 150, denying cert. to 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1974).
56. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 249, 263-66 (S.D.
N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), stay vacated, 94 S. Ct.
3210, cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 150 (1974).
57. Id. at 252, 265.
58. Id. at 270.
59. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), stay va-
cated, 94 S. Ct. 3210, cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 150 (1974). Judge Friendly's opinion was
trenchant:
This appeal illustrates the growing practice of companies that have become
the target of tender offers to seek shelter under § 7 of the Clayton Act ....
In view of the weakness of the "entrenchment" claim, the lack of proof that
[Vol, 1974:633
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On July 12, 1974, Justice Douglas, as Circuit Justice, granted Missouri
Portland's motion to stay the mandate of the court of appeals, thus rein-
stating the district court's injunction against the tender offer.60 On July
25, the full Supreme Court (Justice Blackmun not participating), in a
memorandum decision, granted Cargill's motion to vacate the stay
granted by Justice Douglas. 68 Although the Court's action may be less
than a complete endorsement of the decision of the court of appeals,
the striking down of Missouri Portland's apparently frivolous antitrust
challenge to the tender offer may be considered further evidence that
a new era has begun, in which mergers will be judged on the basis of
the economic and competitive realities of the marketplace instead of
theories constructed to meet the exigencies of a particular merger
case.
2
Cargill exerted any "edge effect" on present competitive conditions, and the
slim likelihood that Cargill would enter the markets here in question de novo
or by toe-hold acquisition, we conclude that [Missouri Portland] was a long
way from demonstrating the probability of success ordinarily required to war-
rant preliminary injunctive relief.
id. at 854, 866 (footnote omitted).
60. See 94 S. Ct. 3210 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from vacation of stay).
61. Id. Justice Douglas filed a caustic dissent:
What the Court does today is a shocking example of the disregard of law to
please the management of huge conglomerates .... By careless neglect we
actually decide that, what appears to be a monstrous violation of the law, may
go on unremedied.
The Court of Appeals did not hold that the findings of the District Court
were "clearly erroneous." The Court of Appeals considered the issue on the
merits to be frivolous ....
The issues . . . raise a substantial question that involves a conflict between
the decisions below and another Circuit Court of Appeals [citing Kennecott].
If we fail to live under a rule of law and instead leave the field open to
the uncontrolled machinations of conglomerates, Cargill will follow the infa-
mous pattern of IT&T, uncontrolled and uncontrollable. . . .. The circuits are
in conflict; and the Court goes pellmell for an escape of this conglomerate
from a real test under existing antitrust law.
Id. at 3210-12.
62. At least one thing is clear. Justice Douglas' dissent is a revealing glimpse into
his views on the antitrust subject matter and further evidence (if any were needed) to
be weighed in determining the existence of "deep-seated judicial bias" in the § 7 field.
See note 12 supra.
A majority of the five Federal Trade Commissioners were undaunted by the actions
of the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court, and, on October 31, 1974, the FTC an-
nounced its intention to issue a complaint against Cargill's acquisition of Missouri Port-
land Cement. FTC Chairman Engman and Commissioner Thompson voted against is-
suing the proposed complaint. Cargill, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REo. REP. 20,745 (FTC
Oct. 31, 1974).
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III. LITIGATION TACTICS SUGGESTED BY
GENERAL DYNAMICS AND MARINE BANCORPORATION
The previous sections of this Article contain the elements of an
answer to the title question. Simply put, a merger case must be won
in the trial court on the basic economic and market facts. Defense
counsel cannot learn how to find, assemble, organize, and present the
necessary evidence by reading Supreme Court opinions in this field. It
is necessary instead to study the trial court opinions and findings of
fact.6" In some cases, the parties' trial briefs and proposed findings
of fact can be helpful. Despite the above discussion of the possibly
limited precedential value of General Dynamics, the trial court decision
in that case 4 provides a first-rate object lesson in: putting together a
winning evidentiary case.
Defense counsel in merger cases always start with a large evidentiary
advantage over government counsel simply because company personnel
are experts in their field of business. The government case, on the
other hand, is almost always in the hands of professional trial attorneys
who have no experience in the particular business and probably little
practical knowledge about it. At most, a few members of the govern-
ment trial team may have been involved in an earlier case involving
the same line of commerce. Essentially the same situation exists at
the Federal Trade Commission.
How are victorious evidentiary presentations put together? Defense
counsel will find that one of the first and most important tasks will be
to persuade the defendant to devote the necessary time and effort to
preparing the case, preferably by assigning one or more knowledgeable
executives to work with the lawyers as a regular job assignment on de-
veloping the facts and witnesses for the case. Antitrust trial prepara-
tion is usually a monumental task. In General Dynamics, the trial rec-
ord ultimately amounted to "more than 7,500 pages of trial transcript
and deposition testimony, and more than 800 trial and deposition exhib-
its, containing in excess of 10,000 pages. 65
The next important step is to find a good economist to assist in trial
63. The latest example of a successful factual defense of a merger in the trial court
is United States v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 5 CCH TRADE REo. REP. (1974-2 Trade Cas.
97,421) 75,208 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 1974), which involved the water pressure pipe
market.
64. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
65. Id. at 535 n.2.
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preparation and possibly to testify as an expert witness. Unfortunately,
this is usually easier said than done. Economists seem to be divided
into two mutually exclusive categories. The so-called macroecono-
mists, whose names are publicized more often by the media, study and
predict general trends in the whole economy or large portions of it.
None of them could serve as an expert witness in an antitrust case with-
out undertaking an intensive study of a particular business. For most,
such study is a task too time-consuming to be undertaken on short no-
tice. The economist needed for an antitrust merger case is the "indus-
trial organization" economist. It will be largely a matter of luck if de-
fense counsel are able to find such a person who is already deeply in-
volved in the study of the business in question and who has the time
and inclination to direct his efforts to preparation for trial of a merger
case. It will be even more remarkable if this person has the personal-
ity, talents at advocacy, and ability to withstand cross-examination that
will make him useful as an expert witness at the trial.
It is not essential, however, to present expert economic testimony in
order to win a merger case. Trial judges are experts at spotting fake
experts, and cross-examining lawyers are good at assisting the bench
in this endeavor. Consequently, it may not be prudent for an econo-
mist to attempt to become an "instant expert" on a business in order
to testify at trial, although he still may be of great assistance in prepa-
ration for trial. Government trial lawyers have the same difficulty in
finding expert witnesses in economics, and the Justice Department's
own economists are seldom qualified experts in the particular business
involved. Consequently, the Government often proceeds to trial in
merger cases without any such testimony.66
In regard to other witnesses, trial judges are greatly impressed by
the bona fide expertise of the businessmen-defendants who have spent
their lives working in the business. The same could be said for cus-
tomers, suppliers, competitors, and trade association personnel. Their
testimony is usually the heart of the defendant's case on the probable
economic effects of a merger. In contrast, the Government's case is
usually either statistical and theoretical, supported by admissions
against interest gleaned from an exhaustive investigation of the defend-
66. This happened in General Dynamics. The defendants presented several bona
fide industry experts and economists, while the Government produced only a "rebuttal
economist" from the staff of the Federal Trade Commission. See id. at 545.
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ant's files,17 or based on the complaining testimony of the defendant's
competitors who fear that the merger will result in increased competi-
tion for them rather than oligopoly in the marketplace."'
In sum, antitrust merger cases must be won on the facts in the trial
court. The law in this respect has not been changed by General Dy-
namics and Marine Bancorporation. What has changed is that the new
majority of the Supreme Court now seems willing to adhere to the
"clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)
in considering appeals in antitrust merger cases.0 9 This standard of ap-
pellate review will ordinarily work to the advantage of antitrust defend-
ants who are able to litigate merger cases before the typically unbiased
federal district judge, since experience shows that antitrust merger de-
fendants commonly win on the merits at the trial court level.70
On the other hand, this attitude toward factfindings will almost cer-
tainly work to the disadvantage of unfortunate antitrust defendants who
must try their merger cases before administrative boards such as the
Federal Trade Commission, which appears to be inherently biased be-
cause of its members' philosophy and sense of mission as an agency
dedicated to the enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act.71  The
67. For example, in Marine Bancorporation,
[t]he Government's only hard evidence of any "wings effect" was a memoran-
dum written in 1962 by an officer of [the Seattle bank] expressing the view
that Spokane banks were likely to engage in price competition as [the Seattle
bank] approached their market. Evidence of an expression of opinion by an
officer of the acquiring bank, not an official of a bank operating in the target
market, in a memorandum written a decade prior to the challenged merger
does not establish a violation of § 7.
418 U.S. at 640.
68. See, e.g., United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1971 Trade Cas.
90,530 passim (N.D. Ill. 1971).
69. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 615 n.13
(1974) (in direct appeal, Court must apply "clearly erroneous" standard).
70. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. I11.
1972); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 332 F. Supp. 970 (D.R.I. 1971); United
States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. 90,530 (N.D. Il1. 1971)
(ITT/Canteen); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19 (D.
Conn. 1970) (ITT/ Grinnell); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F.
Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969) (ITT/Hartford); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.J. 1969); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 233
F. Supp. 976 (S.D. Cal. 1964); United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp.
761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp.
235 (N.D. Ill. 1954) (du Pont/GM).
71. As Justice White pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Marine Bancorpora-
tion:
In the last analysis, one's view of this case, and the rules one devises for
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss4/2
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purpose of the Federal Trade Commission as an antitrust enforcement
agency is obviously far different from that of a federal district judge,
whose goal is the evenhanded administration of justice. Thus, a major,
uncontrollable element in the successful defense of a merger case may
be whether it happens to be selected for investigation and challenge
by the Justice Department rather than the Federal Trade Commission.
Defense counsel have always been remarkably successful in winning
merger cases at the trial level in federal district courts. 72  The Supreme
Court majority opinions over the last twenty years have tended to ob-
scure the excellent evidentiary presentations of defense counsel and
their clients in these cases. Unfortunately for the defendants, the trial
courts were routinely reversed by a Supreme Court majority that
seemed to adopt whatever belated, expedient argument or theory the
Solicitor General's office could salvage from the record evidence. The
weakness of the arguments presented, however, only increases one's
respect for the great ingenuity and superlative appellate advocacy ex-
hibited by the Solicitor General's staff and the Appellate Division of
the Justice Department's Antitrust Division. Even assuming the possi-
bility of "deep-seated judicial bias," the appellate advocate must still
provide the Court with persuasive analysis of the probable effects of
a merger on competition and a plausible evidentiary basis in the trial
record to support those theories. This might be called the final ele-
ment of the answer to the question "How can a merger case be won
in the Supreme Court?" Defense counsel must repeat the trial court
performance on appeal.
assessing whether this merger should be barred, turns on the policy of § 7 of
the Clayton Act to bar mergers which may contribute to further concentration
in the structure of American business.
418 U.S. at 653.
72. See, e.g., cases cited note 70 supra.
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